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We examine the determinants of institutional investors when deciding on international capital 
allocation in Venture Capital and Private Equity Limited Partnerships; this is done through a 
questionnaire addressed to (potential) Limited Partners world-wide. The respondents provide 
information about their criteria for international asset allocation. The protection of property rights 
is the dominant concern, followed by the need to find local quality General Partners, and the 
quality of management and skills of local entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the expected deal flow 
plays an important role in the allocation process, while investors fear bribery and corruption. 
Public funding and subsidies do not play a role at all in the international allocation process. 
Hence, private money does not follow public money. The IPO activity and the size of local public 
equity markets are not as relevant as proposed by other researchers. Our results can support 
policymakers to increase the attractiveness of their countries for institutional investors and, thus, 
to receive more risk capital for innovation, entrepreneurship, employment and growth. 
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International comparisons of Venture Capital and Private Equity (VC/PE) markets reveal that 
there are large differences in the VC/PE activity across nations. On national levels the VC/PE 
activity is often measured as a percentage of GDP. In terms of this ratio, the United Kingdom 
currently leads the world-wide ranking, followed by the United States (EVCA 2007 and NVCA 
2007). While both countries are similar, regarding important investment-related issues, such as 
their common law systems and their entrepreneurial and capital market oriented economies, it 
is interesting to determine the parameters that lead to their attractiveness for institutional 
investors, and differentiate them from other countries with far less VC/PE activity. 
A large body of literature deals with issues concerning the evolvement of vibrant local VC/PE 
markets, and with the parameters that determine institutional investors’ decisions to allocate 
capital in economic regions. We contribute to the existing literature by directly incorporating 
these determinants into a questionnaire addressed to world-wide operating institutional 
investors as the dominant providers of risk capital. In this way, we receive a unique primary 
data set to analyze the most important criteria for institutional investors when evaluating 
international VC/PE capital allocation opportunities. The questionnaire is sent out electronically 
to 1,079 (potential) institutional investors in VC/PE Limited Partnerships (the Limited Partners – 
“LPs”). We perform several tests and analyses and show that the protection of property rights is 
the most important issue when evaluating international VC/PE allocation, followed by the 
desire to find quality local fund management teams (the General Partners – “GPs”), and 
followed in turn by the need to be convinced about the quality and skills of the local 
entrepreneurial managers. Furthermore, in descending order, the expected deal flow plays an 
important role in the allocation process, and the investors fear bribery and corruption. The 
results are significant, and do not meaningfully differ among the sub-groups of institutional 
investors, as, for example, Europeans and non-Europeans. Another very important finding is 
that institutional investors do not at all consider the availability of public subsidies as decision 
criteria in their international allocation process. This puts into doubt the existence of several 
government programs intended to spur the market for risk capital. Additionally, the role of the 
public stock market and the IPO market is not as relevant as expected. Our results confirm 
previous findings on the importance of corporate governance rules and practices and on the  
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unimportance of public subsidies. However, our results contradict with findings on the 
prominence of the IPO activity and the size of the public equity market. Related literature so far 
discusses selections of several determinants and provides evidence by multivariate regressions. 
We are able, for the first time, to rank the importance of all the particular parameters so far 
discussed in similar research papers, by directly addressing institutional investors as the main 
source of VC/PE funding. 
The results lead to more transparency of the international capital allocation process of 
institutional investors and serve as a guideline for policymakers attempting to attract more risk 
capital for their countries to spur innovation, entrepreneurship, growth, and employment. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, we review related literature. Then, we describe the 
study design and the resulting sample. Next, we perform comprehensive analyses of the data 
gathered. Each analysis is immediately followed by an interpretation of the findings. Finally, 
we conclude. 
2. Literature Overview 
A large body of research explores the determinants of VC/PE activity in particular economies; 
Black and Gilson (1998), and Michelacci and Suarez (2004) highlight the important role of the 
stock market for the VC/PE asset class. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) confirm the strong relation 
between VP/PE activity and stock market waves. Jeng and Wells (2000) explore the 
determinants of VC/PE funding for 21 countries and expand the work of Black and Gilson 
(1998). They show that IPOs are the strongest driving force of VC/PE investing. Surprisingly, 
GDP growth and market capitalization are not significant. Gompers and Lerner (2000) 
emphasize that risk capital flourishes in countries with deep and liquid stock markets. 
The availability of debt financing is another key factor for start-ups entering the market, as 
emphasized by Greene (1998), and hence a determinant for a vibrant, local VC/PE market. 
Additionally, the maturity of the VC/PE market itself might attract investors. The maturity of a 
local VC/PE market is also reflected by the number of players and supporting institutions, such 
as law firms, investment banks, M&A boutiques, auditors and consultants. Sapienza et al. (1996) 
claim that whether or not the VC/PE market is accepted within a society, and the historical 
development of that market, determine investor confidence. Balboa and Martí (2003) find that 
annual fundraising volume is dependent on the previous year’s market liquidity. Chemla (2005) 
argues that the management of VC/PE funds is costly. Particular regions become attractive to 
investors only if the deal flow is large enough, and if transaction volumes and expected payoffs 
exceed a certain amount that allows the management fees to be covered. 
La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) prove that the legal environment strongly determines the size 
and extent of a country’s capital market and local firm’s abilities to receive outside funding. 
Glaeser et al. (2001), Djankov et al. (2003 and 2005) suggest that parties in common law-
countries have greater ease in enforcing their rights from commercial contracts. Cumming and 
Johan (2007) highlight that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization increases 
institutional investors’ allocations to the asset class. Desai et al. (2006) investigate the influence 
of institutional settings in 33 European countries, in particular the issues of fairness and the 
protection of property rights, on the entry of enterprises into the markets. The number of new 
enterprises proxies the attractiveness for VC/PE allocations. Cumming et al. (2006a) find that 
the quality of a country’s legal system is much more directly connected to facilitating VC/PE-
backed exits than the size of a country’s stock market. Cumming et al. (2006b) extend this and  
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show that cross-country differences in legality, including legal origin and accounting 
standards, have a significant impact on the governance of investments in the VC/PE industry. 
Better laws facilitate deal-screening and deal-origination. They also facilitate investors’ board 
representations and the use of desired types of securities. Lerner and Schoar (2004) analyze 
VC/PE transaction structures in developing countries and find that the choice of securities is 
driven by the legal and economic circumstances of the nation and of the investing VC/PE 
group. La Porta et al. (2002) find a lower cost of capital for companies in countries with better 
investor protection. Lerner and Schoar (2005) confirm these findings. Johnson et al. (1999) 
show that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in start-up firms. Even so, 
Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), and Svensson (1998) demonstrate that property rights 
significantly affect investments and economic growth. 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) examine the forces that affected independent VC/PE fundraising in 
the US. They conclude that factors such as regulatory changes affecting pension funds, overall 
economic growth, firm-specific performance and reputation all affect fundraising. They point 
out that there are more attractive opportunities for entrepreneurs if the economy is large and 
growing. Wilken (1979) argues that economic development facilitates entrepreneurship, as it 
provides a greater accumulation of capital for investments. Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2004) find that VC/PE activity is related to GDP growth. 
Da Rin et al. (2005) argue that policymakers should consider a wide set of policies to improve 
emerging VC/PE markets, rather than simply channeling funds into the segment. Armour and 
Cumming (2006) confirm this rationale and show that government programs often hinder rather 
than help the development of VC/PE markets. 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) also stress that the capital gains tax rate influences VC/PE activity. 
Bruce (2000 and 2002), and Cullen and Gordon (2002) show that taxes affect the entry and exit 
of businesses. It can be concluded that this should be mirrored in VC/PE activity. 
Rigid labor market policies might negatively affect the attractiveness of a VC/PE market. 
Institutional investors could hesitate investing in countries with exaggerated labor market 
protection and immobility. Lazear (1990), and Blanchard (1997) discuss how protection of 
workers can reduce employment and growth. Black and Gilson (1998) show that variations in 
labor market restrictions correlate with VC/PE activity. 
Access to viable investments is probably another important factor for the attractiveness of a 
regional VC/PE market. In order to foster a growing risk capital industry, Megginson (2004) 
argues that the R&D culture, especially in universities or national laboratories, plays an 
important role. Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that both industrial and academic R&D 
expenditure is significantly correlated with VC/PE activity. Schertler (2003) emphasizes that the 
number of employees in the R&D field and the number of patents, as an approximation of 
human capital endowment, have a positive and highly significant influence on VC/PE activity. 
Furthermore, Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) find that the level of 
entrepreneurship interacts with the R&D capital stock, technological opportunities, and the 
number of patents. Lee and Peterson (2000), and Baughn and Neupert (2003) argue that 
national cultures shape both individual orientation and environmental conditions, which lead 
to different levels of entrepreneurial activity in particular countries, and which should affect the 
level of acceptance of a risk capital culture. The acceptance of a risk capital culture in a society 
should also influence the funding activities of institutional investors.  
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All of the above-mentioned papers focus on the settings of several regional capital markets. 
Most of them run multivariate analyses on secondary data, some of them use surveys among 
General Partners. Our research approach differs: We directly assess the sources of VC/PE 
capital, the (potential) institutional investors on a world-wide scale, and collect, through a 
questionnaire, information about the parameters they evaluate when deciding on international 
VC/PE allocation. For the determination of the parameters we refer to the findings of the 
above-reviewed literature, select the strongest and most important ones, group the parameters, 
and directly ask the respondents about their importance. Therefore, combining the findings of 
previous research and the unique primary data set we gathered, we are able to derive significant 
conclusions on the asset allocation process of institutional investors. 
3. Study Design 
3.1. The Questionnaire and Addressees 
Due to space limitations we do not describe the questionnaire in detail (it is available on 
request), but, in brief, it is divided in two parts. The first part contains some descriptive 
information on the respondent’s institution in terms of its type, its size, and allocation hurdle 
rates; and the second part comprehensively deals with the socio-economic criteria that the 
respondent considers for the international asset allocation decision process for VC/PE 
investments. 
Some of the questions raised provide metric responses, but the majority of the responses are 
ordinal, made via entries on a seven-point Likert scale. Other responses are categorical. The 
ordinal responses on the Likert scales range from not at all important to very important. To 
ensure that no important determinant is missed in our questionnaire, in parallel we ask the 
respondents to determine their most important asset allocation criteria using keywords. The 
analyses of these keywords shall be anticipated at that stage, because they prove that no major 
topic is left out in our questionnaire. 
The survey was addressed via email to 1,079 Limited Partners world-wide. The geographic 
distribution of the addressees is as follows: 77% USA and Canada, 17% Europe, 5% Asia, and 
1% others. The email addresses of the Limited Partners are collected from three commercial 
databases. It is not known what the entire population of LPs is in terms of numbers and funds 
under management, as a reliable or official list of institutional investors that qualify for VC/PE 
partnerships does not exist. Each of the three databases claims to cover the whole population of 
LPs, but, in matching them, we increase the number of players and, hence, gain a unique 
world-wide compendium of Limited Partners. Furthermore, we check several references and 
actively search for important and well-known LPs manually in our repository. We deliberately 
attempt to cover as many LPs as possible. Nevertheless, matching the databases and the cross-
checks might not secure a valid collection of LPs that, at least, represents the entire population. 
Regarding the geographical distribution of investors, for example, we have the following 
concern: Even though the USA, as an economic region and as the best-developed financial 
market, probably embodies the biggest (in terms of fund volumes), most sophisticated, and with 
the largest number of LPs, other regions, notably Asia, might be under-represented. However, in 
terms of funds under management, our data collection reliably represents the population. In our 
depository, none of the larger LPs should be missing, whether in the USA, Europe or Asia, and 
the larger institutions are the more important ones because of their market weight. We believe  
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that an over-representation of the number of US LPs in our depository of addresses will not 
harm our conclusions unless they respond in a different manner. However, we will address this 
issue and investigate our sample regarding differences in the allocation processes of sub-groups 
of the investors. 
3.2. Sample Size, Geographical Structure and Potential Bias 
From the 1,079 Limited Partners addressed we received 75 valid and valuable responses. This is 
a response rate of 7% and quite satisfying, when compared to some other studies that collect 
primary data about investors’ behavior by means of a questionnaire. For instance, Lerner and 
Schoar (2005) collect data from 28 Private Equity funds, and Köke (1999) considers a sample of 
only 21 responses. 
The responding LPs are segmented into the following groups: corporate investors, government 
agencies, banks, pension funds, insurance companies, funds of funds, endowments, and others. 
A geographic distinction is made according to the origin of the investors: USA and Canada, 
Europe, and rest of the world. The segments are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Segmented Respondents (Type and Origin of Investors) 
Type of Investor  Occurrence  Origin of Investor  Occurrence 
Corporate Investors  4  USA and Canada  34 
Government Agency  1  Europe  38 
Banks  3  Rest of the World  3 
Pension Funds  8     
Insurance Companies  1 
Funds of Funds  29 
Endowments 2 
Others 26 




Unfortunately, the response rate from LPs that qualify themselves as ‘others’ is relatively large, 
and therefore, only the ‘funds of funds’ group can be distinguished as homogeneous. 
Furthermore, we received more answers from European LPs (49.3% of all the answers), as 
compared to their occurrence in our depository of 17%. This might bias the results of our study. 
Anyway, the geographical distribution might not be the only cause of a selection bias. As 
discussed further below, the types of investors, the fund sizes, or other criteria might also not 
be sufficiently representative. Unfortunately, since no comparable comprehensive repository of 
investor data exists that provides the necessary information to correct for a potential bias, as 
mentioned above, we are unable to address this issue. However, we assess the responses of sub-
groups of investors, e.g. Europeans and non-Europeans, or small and large funds separately in a 
subsequent section of this paper, and find that there are no meaningful differences in their 
international capital allocation approaches. This leads us to conclude that, even if our sample 
does not perfectly represent the world-wide population of (potential) Limited Partners, our 
findings are not biased.  
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3.3. Funds under Management and VC/PE Commitments 
59 respondents provided information regarding the size of the managed funds, and from 68 we 
received their percentage allocation in the VC/PE asset class. Table 2 presents the distribution of the 
sample, segmented by size and by the world-wide percentage allocation in the VC/PE asset class. 
 
Table 2 
Segmented Respondents (Fund Size) and VC/PE Allocation 
Fund Size  Occurrence VC/PE Allocation  Occurrence 
< €100 m   9  < 30%  29 
€100 m – 999 m  18  30% - 89%  8 
€1,000 m – 9,999 m  23  90% - 100%  31 
> €9,999 m    9     
 
The fund sizes are relatively heterogeneous, while the world-wide commitments to the VC/PE 
asset class are not. A large number of the funds allocate 90% or more of their funds under 
management into the asset class. This leads us to investigate the relationship between the size 
of the fund and the percentage of VC/PE allocation. We assume that the percentage of a fund’s 
allocation in the VC/PE capital market segment decreases with the size of the fund. The reason 
for this is that the smaller funds might be specialized VC/PE vehicles that receive their capital 
from already-diversified investors, and do not need to diversify among different asset classes. 
Therefore, we perform a Kruskal-Wallis test with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk to 
test whether the percentage allocation of the funds differs with fund size. The results are 
reported in Table 3 (note that 58 respondents provided information on both determinants). 
 
Table 3 
Kruskal Wallis Test on the Commitment to the VC/PE Asset Class, Grouped by Size 
Funds under Management  N  Mean Rank 
Mean % commitment to 
VC/PE    
% committed 
to VC/PE 
< €100 m  9  24.06 41.84 Chi-Square  10.264
€100-999 m  18  34.00 67.18 df  3
€1,000-9,999 m  22  33.64 61.27 Asymp. Sig.  .016
> €9,999 m  9  15.83 22.67  
Total  58    54.10  
 
We find a significant difference in the mean commitments of the funds grouped by fund size. 
Hence, H0 has to be rejected, but not in the expected way. The result is rather surprising and 
leads to the conclusion that the smallest and largest funds in our sample (with 41.8% 
respectively with 22.7% average VC/PE allocation in each group) have a smaller percentage 
allocation than the medium-sized funds (between €100 million and €9.9 billion, with average 
allocations of 67.2%, and 61.3% respectively). The medium-sized funds are the entities that are 
more specialized in VC/PE. 
Summarizing these descriptive statistics, it can be reported that we receive a diverse sample of 
(potential) investors in the VC/PE asset class in terms of size, type, relevant geographical 
origins, and exposure in VC/PE. The data is comprehensively analyzed in the subsequent 
sections of this paper.  
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4. Analyses 
The analyses are performed with several non-parametric tests, mainly to determine the rankings 
of the importance of the suggested parameters. Within our statistical tests, we follow the 
approach of not having prior expectations regarding the location of central parameters and, 
hence, define non-directional alternative hypotheses. 
4.1. Country Allocation Criteria 
With our questionnaire, we primarily aim to determine the most important criteria for the 
country allocation process of institutional investors. Therefore, we refer to the findings of the 
cited research papers that deal with asset allocation processes of institutional investors, or 
investigate the necessary requirements for vibrant local VC/PE markets and culture. The 
findings are used to narrow the relevant questions raised to the institutional investors. 
The questionnaire considers all the different issues mentioned in our literature overview, and 
groups them into six major categories: economic activity, capital market, taxation, investor 
protection, social environment, and entrepreneurial opportunities. The respondents are asked to 
evaluate the importance of the individual criteria for their decisions about international asset 
allocation on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, not at all important, to 7, very 
important. First, we perform analyses of the importance of the criteria within each category, 
and then analyses of all individual criteria to determine the most important ones when 
institutional investors decide on international capital allocation. The results are described in the 
following sections. 
4.1.1. The Importance of Economic Activity 
Referring to Gompers and Lerner (1998), Wilken (1979), and Romain and van Pottelsberghe de 
la Potterie (2004), we distinguish the parameters “economic growth” and “economic size” in our 
questionnaire to reveal the importance of the economic activity in a particular country for 
institutional investors’ allocation decisions. Figure 1 presents the assessments of both criteria 
measured by the means and by the ± σ-percentiles of the respondents’ evaluations. 
The graph reveals that economic growth is more important than size, and the dispersion of the 
evaluation of growth is less than that for size. The result is confirmed by a Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test with the Hypothesis H0: µ1 = µ2, and H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. The test statistic is presented in 
Appendix 3 and strongly rejects H0. Hence, when they evaluate economic conditions as part of 
their international asset allocation process, institutional investors regard growth as more 
important than size.  
8 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
Figure 1  









4.1.2. The Importance of the Capital Market 
From the manifold research papers mentioned, we distinguish the following parameters to 
investigate the importance of a local capital market for the international allocation process: 
availability of debt financing, interest rates, capital market and M&A market activity, IPO activity, 
expected deal flow, presence of professional institutions and supporters (law firms, investment 
banks, auditors, and consultants), presence of qualified GPs, availability of public funding and 
subsidies, and the expected diversification effected by committing capital to that local market. 
Figure 2 presents the means of the responses and the ± σ-percentiles for each criterion. 
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The presence of qualified GPs and the expected deal flow are the most important selection 
criteria, with average nominations of 6.35 and 6.17 on the Likert scale. However, deal flow has 
the lowest dispersion of responses, i.e., LPs strongly agree on the importance of that criterion. 
As discussed above, we perform pair-wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests with the hypothesis H0: 
µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk to determine a ranking of the criteria. The test statistics are presented in 
Appendix 2 and the results in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 








The tests reveal that the quality of GPs and the deal flow expectations dominate the other 
criteria; both criteria rank either first or second, but definitely before the general capital and 
M&A market activity. The quoted capital market segment, the M&A market, and IPO activity are 
nevertheless important allocation criteria for LPs, but not as dominant as expected. The 
presence of qualified GPs and the expected deal flow are hard to measure and, therefore, not 
yet explicitly analyzed in literature. However, our findings contradict with existing literature 
that emphasizes the special importance of the exit conditions for transactions by IPOs, as, for 
example, Jeng and Wells (2000). This contradiction could be caused by the fact that Jeng and 
Wells (2000) do not analyze the importance of the more important factors here determined, or 
due to collinearity, where the independent variables were so highly correlated that it became 
difficult or impossible to distinguish their individual influences. 
Interestingly, the debt market and the price of debt are not as meaningful as anticipated, for 
instance, according to Greene (1998). One could argue that the price of debt is an indicator for the 
minimum return requirements in a particular country and, hence, plays a role for the allocation 
process. However, LPs obviously do not consider this criterion important in general. Furthermore, 
diversification does not play an important role for investors in the VC/PE market segment. LPs 
seem to be well diversified already, or aware that they manage already well-diversified money. 
A clear finding, and one that might be unpleasant for policymakers, is that the availability of 
public funding and subsidies is not an important issue for institutional investors when deciding 
on their VC/PE allocations. The (potential) investors regard this as the least important (mean 
= 3.23) of all the criteria we consider in the questionnaire. However, the criterion also has a 
large dispersion (standard deviation = 1.42), signaling that some of the investors obviously 
follow public activities. Summarizing this issue, which is in line with the findings of Da Rin et 
al. (2005) and Armour and Cumming (2006), it can be argued that private money does not, in 
the end, follow public money in the VC/PE market segment. 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Presence of qualified GPs  1 or 2 
Expected deal flow  1 or 2 
General capital and M&A market activity  3 
Presence of professional institutions to support  4 
Availability of debt finance in the target country  5 or 6 
IPO market activity  5 or 6 
Interest rates in the target country  7 or 8 
Diversification effect  7 or 8 
Availability of public funding and subsidies  9  
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4.1.3. The Importance of Taxes 
Referring to Gompers and Lerner (1998), Bruce (2000 and 2002), and Cullen and Gordon (2002), 
we focus on the corporate tax rate and dividend and capital gains taxes, in determining the 
importance of taxes in respect to institutional investors’ international allocation decisions. 
Despite many other taxes and tax policies that potentially influence the activities of LPs in 
individual countries, the ones mentioned are those that have the greatest impact on business, 
and those that are somewhat comparable across countries with different tax regimes. Corporate 
taxes are relevant on the transaction level, and dividend and capital gains taxes on the investor 
level. Figure 3 presents the means of the nominations concerning their importance, and the 
± σ-percentiles for both taxes. 
Figure 3 










We propose the hypothesis that both of the taxes are equally important, H0: µ1 = µ2, while the 
alternative is that the importance differs, H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. The Wilkoxon Signed Rank test proves 
dominance of dividend and capital gains taxes. The test result is presented in Appendix 3. As 
also proved by Gompers and Lerner (1998), investors are more concerned about the taxes that 
affect them directly. 
4.1.4. The Importance of Property Rights Protection 
Since property rights and investor protection play such a dominant role in literature on 
investment determinants and practice, we directly raise the question about their importance in 
the international asset allocation process. The overwhelming result is a mean importance of 
6.55. The answers range from 4 to 7 points only and, therefore, have the lowest dispersion of 
all the responses, with a standard deviation of 0.63. This reveals that LPs very much agree that 
their protection is the most important issue among all the selection criteria we consider in the 
questionnaire. We will describe the tests for the overall importance of particular criteria at a 
later stage in this paper. 
This result is in line with La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) who confirm that the legal 
environment greatly determines the size and extent of a country’s capital market and local 
firms’ ability to receive outside financing, and with Desai et al. (2006) and Lerner and Schoar 









Corporate Tax Rate [71] Div. and Cap. Gains
Taxes [60]












IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 11 
rights. It is further in line with Cumming et al. (2006a and 2006b) who show that cross-country 
differences in legality impact the quality of governance of VC/PE investments. 
4.1.5. The Importance of the Social Environment 
As highlighted in the above-cited literature, we distinguish the following criteria as 
determinants that might influence the allocation decisions of institutional investors when 
considering the social environment of their VC/PE target countries: bribery and corruption, the 
crime rate, expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills, language and cultural 
differences, labor market rigidities, and acceptance of VC/PE. Figure 4 presents the mean 
nominations and the ± σ-percentiles of the mentioned determinants. 
Figure 4 











Again, Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk result in the 
ranking in Table 5. The test statistics are presented in Appendix 4. 
 
Table 5 








The tests reveal that the expected quality of management is the most important criterion when 
evaluating the social environment of a country for VC/PE allocations, followed by the issues of 
bribery and corruption, and the acceptance of the asset class in the country. The finding 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Expected Entrepreneurial Management Quality and Skills  1 
Bribing and Corruption  2 
Acceptance of VC/PE  3 
Crime Rate  4 or 5 
Labor Market Rigidities  4 or 5 
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underpins the common-sense approach found in VC/PE practice when referring to the asset 
class as “people’s business”. Institutional investors allocate funds to particular countries if they 
are convinced about the quality and the skills of local management teams. This finding is also 
consistent with Farag et al. (2004), Bliss (1999), Karsai et al. (1998), and Chu and Hisrich (2001). 
The crime rate, labor market rigidities and language and cultural differences do not play such 
an important role in their approach to country allocation. 
4.1.6. The Importance of the Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
To contribute to the discussion of the importance of entrepreneurial opportunities that might 
influence the decisions taken by institutional investors concerning their international 
allocations, we distinguish the parameters as follows: already-proven success strategies, general 
entrepreneurial activity, and technological innovations and patents. Figure 5 presents the mean 
nominations and the ± σ-percentiles of the investors’ answers regarding these determinants. 
 
Figure 5 




























The Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests, presented in Appendix 5, with the hypotheses H0: µi = µk, and 
H1: µi ≠ µk lead to a clear ranking headed by the entrepreneurial activities, followed by already-
proven success and the criterion innovations and patents. LPs are obviously future-oriented 
investors that prefer to draw conclusions about future options from the current entrepreneurial 
spirit rather than from historic success, or just from the number of patents. This result is in line 
with Lee and Peterson (2000) and Baughn and Neupert (2003) who emphasize the role of 
cultural shapes, individuals’ orientations, and environmental conditions that create 
entrepreneurial spirit and activity. It somehow contradicts the finding of Schertler (2003) who 
proposes the number of patents to be a strong indicator for the VC/PE activity in a particular 
country. 
4.2. Most Important Criteria 
So far, we have investigated the importance of several criteria grouped into six categories. Now, 
we address the five most important criteria of them all. The criteria with the highest average  
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important scores are: protection of property and investor’s rights (6.55), presence of qualified 
GPs (6.35), expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills (6.35), expected deal flow 
(6.17), and bribery and corruption (5.91). Wilkoxon Signed Rank tests with the hypotheses H0: 
µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk are described in Appendix 6 and lead to the results presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 







Table 6 reveals that the definition of absolute ranks is impossible on a 0.05 significance level. 
However, the protection of investors is the dominant criterion that can either rank at the first or 
at the second position. The investors’ claims in the funds and, additionally, the claims of the 
funds in the target companies have to be secured. If institutional investors are not confident 
with that issue, they are reluctant to invest. Hence, issues relating to investor protection are the 
major obstacles for the development of regional VC/PE markets. 
Nevertheless, the presence of qualified GPs follows closely (at rank 1, 2, 3, or 4). Next is the 
expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills (ranking at 2, 3, or 4, but not ahead of 
investor protection), and both criteria emphasize once again the role of talented people for the 
asset class. If investors do not feel they can rely on people as the driving forces of the VC/PE 
business and of the target companies, they will not commit capital. Following on from the role 
of people, the expected deal flow materializes. It has to be emphasized here that the potential 
deal flow also depends on several other socio-economic and market factors, and it is difficult to 
regard it as a particular determinant. The deal flow, for instance, is certainly influenced by 
other variables, such as economic growth and size, and by the presence of supporting 
institutions, such as investment banks and M&A boutiques, among others. 
Finally, and coinciding with their desire for protection, investors fear bribery and corruption as 
these directly interfere with the enforcement of their claims. 
The results strongly confirm the findings on the importance of property rights protection, such 
as La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998), Johnson et al. (1999), Glaeser et al. (2001), Djankov et al. 
(2003 and 2005), Lerner and Schoar (2004 and 2005), Desai et al. (2006), Cumming et al. (2006a 
and 2006b), and Cumming and Johan (2007). However, all the papers mentioned do not address 
investors directly, but derive their conclusions by proxies. Our results also confirm the 
conclusions on the importance of management quality by Farag et al. (2004), Bliss (1999), 
Karsai et al. (1998), and Chu and Hisrich (2001). The findings of the manifold other research 
papers gooted are not directly contradicted, but we prove that all the other criteria analyzed in 
those papers are of less importance than the criteria listed in Table 6. 
Criteria Rank(s) 
Protection of Property and Investor’s Rights  1 or 2 
Presence of Qualified GPs  1 or 2 or 3 or 4 
Expected Entrepreneurial Management Quality and Skills  2 or 3 or 4 
Expected Deal Flow  2 or 3 or 4 or 5 
Bribing and Corruption  4 or 5  
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4.3. Sample Bias and Grouping Investors 
Our heterogeneous sample of 75 LPs allows partitioning in several homogeneous sub-samples. 
The following categories can be assigned to the respondents: They are either European or not, 
they are either small or big (split by the median of fund size), they are either funds of funds or 
not, or they either can or cannot be grouped into entities that are focused on VC/PE investments 
and hence specialized (with high percentage VC/PE exposure). All of the criteria split the sample 
roughly by half. The research question for the sub-samples is always whether there are any 
differences regarding their capital allocation processes. We obtain the required results by running 
Mann Whitney U tests. First, we distinguish European and non-European LPs. 
It could be argued that European and non-European investors follow different criteria in their 
international asset allocation process. To test these hypotheses we perform Mann Whitney U 
tests, using H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. Having tested for every single parameter, we present 
only the test statistics with significant results in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Test Statistics with Significant Results 
 
European    
max % in 
single fund 
Growth prospects of 
the target country 
0  N  30 29
  Mean  22.73 5.45
  Std. Deviation  17.78 .827
1  N  33 28
  Mean  14.36 5.96
  Std. Deviation  15.94 .96
  Mann-Whitney U  296.5 258.5
  Z  -2.770 -2.494
  Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .006 .013
 
Table 7 presents the test statistics for the analyses, where partitioning the sample into European 
(= 1) and non-European (= 0) LPs gives significant results (also having tested for all the other 
possible parameters). The results reveal that non-European investors are prepared to maintain a 
higher maximum exposure in a fund, and that European investors focus more on growth 
expectations in their international allocation process. However, we do not find meaningful and 
significant differences between European and non-European LPs regarding any other 
determinant than those two mentioned. This allows us to conclude that institutional investors 
operating on an international level do not differ greatly across different regions of origin in 
their approaches to international capital allocation. 
Next, we differentiate the size of the fund and split the sample by the median of the funds 
under management. We test all parameters available for potential differences in the two groups 
of funds by using Mann Whitney U tests, with H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. Table 8 presents the 
test statistics with significant results.  
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Table 8 
Test Statistics with Significant Results 
 
Larger 
Fund    










0    N  26 28 27 26  27
    Mean  7.64 5.28 3.85 4.58  4.48
    Std. Deviation  8.22 1.36 1.43 1.42  1.53
1    N  28 29 29 26  29
    Mean  14.24 4.76 2.86 3.62  3.72
    Std. Deviation  19.97 1.057 1.27 1.63  1.44
    Mann-Whitney U  261.0 296.0 233.0 226.0  275.0
    Z  -1.792 -2.000 -2.700 -2.089  -1.951
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .073 .045 .007 .037  .051
 
We find that larger funds have a higher level of minimum exposure in a single GP, and they 
rate the availability of debt and public subsidies in the target country, diversification effects, 
and language and cultural differences lower than the smaller funds do. These differences can be 
directly related to the fund size: larger LPs will also search for larger exposures in single funds 
to minimize GP searching and due diligence cost. They neither need to lever their exposure so 
much, by including debt and public subsidies in transaction financing. Thereby, it has to be 
mentioned, that the availability of public subsidies does not receive a high level of importance 
from smaller funds either (it is 3.85). Their evaluated level of importance only significantly 
differs from that one of the larger funds (2.86). Further, for larger funds it is easier to diversify 
their portfolio, therefore diversification is less important for them. Finally, within management 
teams of larger funds it should be easier to cover different languages, regions, and cultures and, 
hence, these determinants are also evaluated as less important by the larger funds. 
The following analyses deal with differences between: a) those funds dedicated to VC/PE only, and 
b) the rest. We distinguish the funds dedicated to the VC/PE asset class from the others on the basis 
of the percentage of fund allocation to VC/PE being higher than 90%. It could be argued that the 
focused funds are more experienced and more professional in their due diligence and allocation 
processes. To test these and other hypotheses, we perform Mann Whitney U tests again, using H0: 
µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. Table 9 presents the test statistics with significant results. 
Table 9 
Test Statistics with Significant Results 
 
VC/PE 
Focused    




of the target 
country 
Availability of 
debt in the 
target country
Entrepreneurial mana-
gement quality/ skills 




0    N  36 31 37 37 37
    Mean  16.56 5.90 4.59 6.19 5.14
    Std. Deviation  17.36 .83 1.34 .70 1.46
1    N  23 22 29 29 28
    Mean  21.57 5.41 5.38 6.52 5.86
    Std. Deviation  17.75 1.01 .98 .69 .89
    Mann-Whitney U  303.5 241.5 346.0 395.0 375.0
    Z  -1.743 -1.905 -2.538 -2.003 -1.955
    Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .081 .057 .011 .045 .051 
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Table 9 presents the test statistics for the analyses, where splitting the sample into VC/PE 
specialized LPs (= 1) and non-specialized LPs (= 0) leads to significant results. The specialized 
funds are willing to subscribe larger maximum stakes in single funds. In their regional due 
diligence process they do not consider growth opportunities as that important, and therefore 
focus on the availability of debt finance, the expected entrepreneurial management quality and 
skills of people, and on the acceptance of the asset class in the target region. The greater 
importance given to debt might result from a larger exposure of these funds in later stage 
investments (such as buyouts and turnaround financing) where debt financing plays a larger 
role. This could similarly be the case for societal acceptance, because later stage transactions 
are more often publicly debated, typically due to their size and the consequences of 
restructuring. The increased attention granted from specialized funds to managerial potential 
might result from the funds’ greater experience on the level of individual transactions, where 
the requirement for excellent management teams often becomes obvious. In summary, it can be 
argued that investors closer to the individual target investments have only slightly different 
opinions in regard to several allocation criteria. 
The final distinction is made by separating funds of funds from other categories of investors. 
Funds of funds will, as indicated by the name, diversify among different funds. They delegate 
the management activities to lower levels and, therefore, have to rely more on the subsequent 
chain of agents than other investors who can allocate their capital more directly. As a result, 
they should differ in respect to their allocation profiles, and they might have different asset 
allocation criteria and regional perceptions. To test these hypotheses we perform Mann Whitney 
U tests once again, using H0: µi = µk, and H1: µi ≠ µk. The test statistics with significant results 
are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Test Statistics with Significant Results 
 
Fund of 
Fund    
% committed to 
VC/PE 






0  N  40 34 43  43
  Mean  34.57 10.56 6.07  5.21
  Std. Deviation  39.67 18.14 1.32  1.34
1  N  27 26 25  27
   Mean  87.19 14.69 6.84  5.93
   Std. Deviation  26.58 12.18 .374  1.04
  Mann-Whitney U  178.0 261.0 364.0  398.0
  Z  -4.854 -2.743 -2.630  -2.274
   Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .006 .009  .023
 
The proposed differences are supported by the data. Firstly, the funds of funds do not greatly 
differ from the specialized funds we considered previously in the sample partition tests. They 
are characterized by a significant average commitment to the VC/PE asset class of 87.2% and a 
median of even 100%. This show that the majority of the funds of funds are, at the same time, 
focused on VC/PE and are therefore, in fact, VC/PE Funds of Funds. However, analyzing the 
data more closely reveals that nine funds with 100% VC/PE exposure do not qualify themselves 
as funds of funds, and inversely, five funds identify themselves as funds of funds but each have 
a very low VC/PE exposure. Whatever the case may be, it can be argued that, once again, we 
identify a more specialized type of investor and find that, while their funds under management  
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are not significantly larger than those of their peers, they are looking for a higher level of 
commitment in general and, hence, raise the minimum commitment level. Also, they have an 
even greater focus on people, because they regard the presence of qualified GPs as well as 
societal acceptance of the asset class as more important than other investors. This is probably 
due to the fact that, as mentioned before, funds of funds have to rely heavily on the agents in 
the subsequent chain of diversification. 
Summarizing the results of partitioning the sample, we claim that there are some minor 
differences in the capital allocation strategies of certain sub-groups. However, the strategies do 
not vary to such an extent that our general results could become meaningfully biased towards a 
particular sub-group of institutional investors in our sample. 
5. Conclusions 
With a questionnaire sent out to 1,079 (potential) limited partners on a world-wide scale we 
address the investors’ decision determinants for investments in VC/PE limited partnerships. The 
approach assures a primary and direct source of information. We group possible allocation 
parameters into six criteria: economic activity, capital market, taxation, property rights 
protection, social environment and entrepreneurial activity. Within those groups we identify the 
most important decision parameters. The protection of property rights stands out as the most 
important issue of all the aspects suggested as asset allocation determinants. This confirms 
numerous other research papers that do not address investors directly but measure its 
importance via proxies. 
When assessing the capital market and VC/PE market conditions, LPs search for qualified GPs 
and are interested in the deal flow. The size and liquidity of a stock market, as well as the IPO 
activity, are of much lower importance, a finding that contradicts previous literature. Regarding 
the social environment, the expected entrepreneurial management quality and skills and the 
fear of bribery and corruption act as determinants in the decision-making process. Finally, 
when taking decisions about country allocation, the investors focus on entrepreneurial activity 
and the entrepreneurial climate. The availability of public funding and subsidiaries plays no 
role in allocation decisions, and public money will not attract private money. 
Our results contribute to more transparency of the international asset allocation processes of 
institutional investors and to a better understanding of investment obstacles. Local 
policymakers should benefit from our findings and detect weaknesses in their countries 
regarding the investors’ allocation criteria. The y  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  e x p l o i t  t h i s  r o o m  f o r  
improvement to attract risk capital. Future research can pick up our findings on the importance 
of the individual decision parameters and explore the relationship between those parameters 
and the actual risk capital funding volumes in particular countries, or can set up country 
rankings according to the criteria.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 




   N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
General economic 
size, measured by 
the GDP 
70  4.76  1.221 1 7 4.00  5.00  6.00
Growth prospects 
of the target 
country 
58  5.72  .933 3 7 5.00  6.00  6.00
 
Ranks 
   N  Mean Rank  Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks  5(a) 17.30 86.50 
Positive Ranks  36(b) 21.51 774.50 
Ties  17(c)     
Growth prospects of the 
target country - General 
economic size, measured 
by the GDP 
Total  58     
a  Growth prospects of the target country < General economic size, measured by the GDP 
b  Growth prospects of the target country > General economic size, measured by the GDP 




Growth prospects of the target country - 
General economic size, measured by the GDP
Z  -4.584(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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Appendix 2 




   N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
Availability of debt 
finance in the target 
country 
71  4.92  1.262  2  7  4.00  5.00  6.00
Interest rates in the 
target country  66  4.33  1.128  2  7  3.75  4.00  5.00
General capital market 
and M&A market 
activity 
69  5.72  .953  3  7  5.00  6.00  6.00
IPO market activity  69  4.90  1.152  2  7  4.00  5.00  6.00
Expected deal flow  70  6.17  .916  4  7  6.00  6.00  7.00
Presence of 
professional 
institutions to support 
70  5.36  1.204  2  7  5.00  5.50  6.00
Presence of qualified 
GPs  68  6.35  1.130  3  7  6.00  7.00  7.00
Availability of public 
funding and subsidies  69  3.23  1.416  1  7  2.00  4.00  4.00
Diversification 
effect/tracking the 
market portfolio  64  4.16  1.566  1  7  3.00  4.00  5.00
 
Test Statistics(c): Availability of Debt vs. other Criteria 
  
Interest 




































to support - 
Availability of 
debt finance 


























in the target 
country 




.000  .000  .948  .000  .004  .000  .000  .005
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Based on negative ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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deal flow - 
Interest 






to support - 
Interest 
























in the target 
country 
Z  -6.216(a)  -3.678(a)  -6.522(a)  -4.771(a)  -6.050(a)  -4.830(b)  -.499(b)
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed)  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .617
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 



















































Z  -5.115(a)  -4.026(b)  -1.979(a)  -3.245(b)  -6.789(a)  -5.238(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed)  .000  .000  .048  .001  .000  .000
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Based on negative ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 









support - IPO 
market activity 
Presence of 











portfolio - IPO 
market activity 
Z  -6.107(a)  -2.566(a)  -5.741(a)  -6.066(b)  -3.012(b)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .010  .000  .000  .003
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.  
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Z  -4.807(a)  -1.783(b)  -6.988(a)  -6.108(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .075  .000  .000 
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Based on negative ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
Test Statistics(c): Presence of Professional Institutions vs. other Criteria 
  
Presence of 




















Z  -4.998(a)  -6.774(b)  -4.169(b)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .000
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 













Z  -6.784(a)  -5.594(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
   










Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .001
a  Based on negative ranks. 
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Appendix 3 




   N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
Corporate tax 




60  5.05  1.567  1  7  4.00  5.00  6.00
 
  







Z  -2.882(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .004 
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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Appendix 4 




   N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
Bribing and 
corruption  70  5.91  1.073  1  7  5.00  6.00  7.00
Crime rate  70  4.91  1.491  1  7  4.00  5.00  6.00
Entrepreneurial 
management 
quality/skills of local 
people 
71  6.35  .699  5  7  6.00  6.00  7.00
Language and 





70  4.87  1.141  1  7  4.00  5.00  6.00
Acceptance of 
VC/PE  70  5.49  1.271  2  7  5.00  6.00  6.25
 
Test Statistics(c): Bribing and Corruption vs. others 
  






















VC/PE - Bribing 
and corruption 
Z  -5.186(a)  -3.045(b)  -6.504(a)  -5.473(a)  -2.629(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .002  .000  .000  .009
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Based on negative ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 















people) - Crime 
rate 
Acceptance of 
VC/PE - Crime 
rate 
Z  -5.973(a)  -4.221(b)  -.585(b)  -2.531(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .559  .011 
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.  
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Z  -7.035(a)  -6.675(a)  -5.014(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000  .000
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
 















Z  -4.644(a)  -5.702(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .000
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
   
Test Statistics(b): Labor Market Rigidities vs. Acceptance of VC/PE 
  
Acceptance of 







Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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   N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  25th 
50th 
(Median)  75th 
Already proven 
success strategies  69  5.54  .994  3  7  5.00  6.00  6.00
Entrepreneurial 
activity in the target 
country 




68  4.56  1.460  1  7  4.00  5.00  6.00
 
   
Test Statistics(c): Already Proven Success Strategies vs. other Criteria 
  
Entrepreneu-













Z  -2.224(a)  -4.626(b)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .026  .000
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
  






activity in the 
target country 
Z  -5.561(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
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Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test on the Five Most Important Criteria 
 
Test Statistics(c): Expected Deal Flow vs. others 
  
Presence of 
















local people - 
Expected deal 
flow 
Z  -1.783(a)  -2.742(a)  -1.363(b)  -1.588(a) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .075  .006  .173  .112 
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 














local people - 
Presence of 
qualified GPs 
Z  -1.003(a)  -2.893(b)  -.341(b)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .316  .004  .733
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
   















Z  -4.594(a)  -1.993(a)
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .000  .046
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 
 









Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)  .002
a  Based on negative ranks. 
b  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
 